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INTRODUCTION
A woman has just lost her husband. Among the many other
things on her mind, she is worried about her financial security. She
has just retired, and her recently deceased husband was two years
from retirement. They had planned to fund their retirement through
1
his money purchase pension plan. She contacts his pension plan
administrator to receive the death benefit payable upon her husband’s passing. The plan administrator informs her that the pension
plan documents show that the beneficiary is not her, but rather her
husband’s ex-wife. The surviving spouse informs the plan administrator that the ex-wife waived her right to the pension plan many years
ago in a divorce agreement with her then-husband. Who receives the
2
pension money?
†
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1
A money purchase pension plan is a defined contribution pension plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). See 6 DAVID
L. BACON & DAVID W. TUCKER, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 150.04[2] (2006) (discussing the attributes of money purchase pension plans).
2
In this situation, ERISA partially protects the interest of the surviving spouse by
requiring that a surviving spouse receive at least fifty percent of the pension plan balance as a qualified preretirement survivor annuity (QPSA). 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e)(2)
(2000). See generally BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, § 150.06[7] (providing an indepth discussion of ERISA’s survivor benefit rules). A QPSA must be provided to the
surviving spouse of a vested participant in certain ERISA-defined benefit plans or
money purchase pension plans who dies before the annuity starting date. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1055(a) (2000). In a situation where a living participant is already receiving pension
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The answer to this question is the subject of a long-lived circuit
3
split in the federal courts. At issue is “whether administrators of an
ERISA plan are required to recognize a beneficiary’s waiver of his or
4
her benefits.” The issue has been addressed in numerous federal appellate decisions over the last fifteen years. The majority view, known
as the “federal common law approach,” holds that beneficiaries may
effectively waive their rights to the benefits of an ERISA plan if the
5
waiver meets certain criteria determined under federal common law.
The “minority rule,” by contrast, contends that beneficiaries may not
waive their rights to the benefits of an ERISA plan, and that the plan
administrator therefore must pay the beneficiary listed in the plan
6
documents.
This Comment argues that the federal common law approach is
the preferable rule to apply when evaluating waivers of benefits by
ERISA plan beneficiaries. The federal common law approach better
benefits, ERISA contains a parallel provision for a qualified joint and survivor annuity
(QJSA). Id. A QJSA requires that a surviving spouse continue to receive at least fifty
percent of pension benefit payments received during the joint lives of the participant
and spouse. Id. § 1055(d)(1). Thus, even if the beneficiary’s waiver is ineffective, the
surviving spouse will still receive fifty percent of the benefit with the remaining fifty
percent going to the named beneficiary.
3
See George A. Norwood, Who Is Entitled To Receive a Deceased Participant’s ERISA
Retirement Plan Benefits—An Ex-Spouse or Current Spouse? The Federal Circuits Have an Irreconcilable Conflict, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 61, 65-71 (1998) (detailing the history of the circuit split); Keron A. Wright, Comment, “Stuck on You”: The Inability of an Ex-Spouse to
Waive Rights Under an ERISA Pension Plan [McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241
(3d Cir. 2005)], 45 WASHBURN L.J. 687, 694-95 (2006) (discussing the approaches of
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits); Donald P. Carleen, Refusal To Honor Beneficiary’s Waiver
of Pension Benefits Is Upheld, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 16, 2005, at 3, 5 (analyzing the circuit split in
light of McGowan, a recent decision by the Third Circuit).
4
McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 244 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No.
05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007). “ERISA” refers to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
5
E.g., Estate of Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1996);
Mohamed v. Kerr, 53 F.3d 911, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1995); Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
18 F.3d 1321, 1327 (5th Cir. 1994); Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension
Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
6
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit whose decisions comprehensively support
the minority view. See, e.g., McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311-12 (6th Cir. 1990)
(stating that ERISA’s “clear statutory command” requires the court to give effect to the
plain language of the plan). A recent Third Circuit decision held in favor of the minority view for certain ERISA plans. McGowan, 423 F.3d at 245-46. The Second Circuit
has indicated its preference for the minority view in dicta. See Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 16 (2d Cir. 1993) (“It would be counterproductive to compel the
Policy administrator to look beyond [beneficiary] designations into varying state laws
regarding wills, trusts and estates, or domestic relations to determine the proper beneficiaries of Policy distributions.”).
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serves ERISA’s equitable purpose of safeguarding employees’ rights to
their plan benefits while remaining consistent with ERISA’s statutory
language. Part I provides an overview of ERISA and its relevant provisions. Part II reviews the minority rule by examining the three primary arguments advocated by its proponents. Part III examines the
federal common law approach and the decisions of the circuits that
support it. Finally, Part IV discusses the reasons why the federal
common law approach should govern waivers of ERISA plan benefits
by nonparticipant beneficiaries.
I. ERISA
7

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)
is the principal federal statute that regulates employee benefit plans.
ERISA is a wide-reaching statute that covers most employee benefit
8
9
plans and affects a majority of the U.S. population.
A. Types of ERISA Plans
There are two types of ERISA employee benefit plans: “employee
10
welfare benefit plan[s]” (welfare plans) and “employee pension bene-

7

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
See id. § 1003 (defining ERISA’s scope). The primary employee benefit plans
that are not covered by ERISA include government plans, church plans, plans “maintained solely for the purpose of complying with applicable workmen’s compensation
laws or unemployment compensation or disability insurance laws,” plans “maintained
outside of the United States primarily for the benefit of persons substantially all of
whom are nonresident aliens,” and unfunded excess benefit plans. Id. § 1003(b).
9
See Craig Copeland, Retirement Plan Participation and Retirees’ Perception of Their
Standard of Living, EBRI ISSUE BRIEF (Employee Benefits Research Inst., Wash., D.C.),
Jan. 2006, at 1, 31, available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/EBRI_IB_01-2006.pdf
(“[T]he extent of employment-based retirement plan use over workers’ lifetimes is
significantly greater than . . . 50 percent.”).
10
29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2000) (emphasis added). An employee welfare benefit
plan is
any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that such plan, fund,
or program was established or is maintained for the purpose of providing for
its participants or their beneficiaries, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation
benefits, apprenticeship or other training programs, or day care centers,
scholarship funds, or prepaid legal services . . . .
Id.
8
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11

fit plan[s]” (pension plans). Pension plans can be categorized further as either “defined contribution plan[s]” (also called “individual
12
13
account plans”) or “defined benefit plan[s].” Within this statutory
structure, beneficiary waiver disputes most frequently arise in three
14
contexts: employer-provided life insurance welfare plans, defined
15
16
benefit pension plans, and money purchase pension plans. Beneficiary waivers rarely arise in connection with 401(k) plans because the
ERISA provisions surrounding qualified preretirement survivor annui17
ties (QPSAs) and qualified joint and survivor annuities (QJSAs) have
led most 401(k) plans to include a provision requiring that the employee’s spouse receive the balance in the participant’s account upon
the participant’s death, unless the spouse waives her rights in writing
18
prior to the designation of an alternate beneficiary. Because not all

11

Id. § 1002(2)(A). An employee pension benefit plan is:
any plan, fund, or program . . . established or maintained by an employer or
by an employee organization, or by both, to the extent that by its express
terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances such plan, fund, or program—
(i) provides retirement income to employees, or
(ii) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the
termination of covered employment or beyond, regardless of the method of
calculating the contributions made to the plan, the method of calculating the
benefits under the plan or the method of distributing benefits from the plan.
Id.
12

Id. § 1002(34). A defined contribution plan is “a pension plan which provides
for an individual account for each participant and for benefits based solely upon the
amount contributed to the participant’s account, and any income, expenses, gains and
losses, and any forfeitures of accounts of other participants which may be allocated to
such participant’s account.” Id. The distinguishing feature of defined contribution
plans is that the employee bears the investment risk for the contributed funds and thus
is not guaranteed a particular amount at retirement. BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1,
§ 148.05[1]. Examples of common defined contribution pension plans include money
purchase pension plans, 401(k) plans, and profit sharing plans. Id.
13
29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) (2000). A defined benefit plan generally is “a pension
plan other than an individual account plan.” Id. A defined benefit plan guarantees
the participant specified benefits upon retirement. BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, §
148.05[2]. Hence, the employer bears the investment risk. Id.
14
E.g., Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1322-23 (5th Cir. 1994).
15
E.g., Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d
275, 277 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Trs. of Iron Workers Local 451 Annuity Fund v.
O’Brien, 937 F. Supp. 346, 347 (D. Del. 1996).
16
E.g., McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 310-11 (6th Cir. 1990).
17
See supra note 2 (discussing ERISA’s QPSA and QJSA requirements).
18
See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a)-(b)(1)(C) (2000) (providing for QPSAs and QJSAs in
most individual account plans).
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ERISA provisions apply to each plan type, it is critical to know the ERISA plan type when analyzing a beneficiary waiver claim.
B. Purpose and Regulatory Scheme
19

“ERISA is an intricate, comprehensive statute” with dual pur20
poses. The first and primary purpose is “to promote the interests of
21
employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.” The
second purpose is to ensure “that ERISA plans be uniform in their in22
terpretation and simple in their application.” The first purpose of
ERISA can be regarded as protecting employees and the second as
23
protecting employers.
ERISA pursues its objectives through a federal regulatory scheme
24
of reporting and disclosure requirements and fiduciary responsibility
25
provisions for all ERISA plans. Additionally, ERISA imposes partici26
pation, vesting, and funding requirements on pension plans. In order to effect the administration and enforcement of ERISA’s regulatory scheme in light of state regulation of retirement benefits,
Congress added an expansive preemption clause, which states that
ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate
27
to any employee benefit plan.” The Supreme Court broadly inter19

Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997).
See McMahon v. Digital Equip. Corp., 162 F.3d 28, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1998) (setting
out ERISA’s two primary purposes).
21
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); see also Michael Allen, The
Studebaker Incident and Its Influence on the Private Pension Plan Reform Movement, in JOHN
H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 68, 70 (3d ed.
2000) (explaining how the failure of Studebaker’s pension plan prompted concern
about the security of pension benefits and thus influenced the enactment of ERISA).
Promoting the interests of participants and their beneficiaries is a far-reaching objective with many components. See BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, § 147.01 (setting forth
ERISA’s purposes in detail).
22
McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 312 (6th Cir. 1990).
23
See Demars v. CIGNA Corp., 173 F.3d 443, 446 (1st Cir. 1999) (“In passing
ERISA, Congress’s purpose was twofold: to protect employees and to protect employers.”). Classifying the second purpose of ERISA as protecting employers is an accurate,
but simplified, statement. The rationale underlying the second purpose of ERISA is to
protect employers, so that employers will be willing to sponsor ERISA plans.
24
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-31 (2000).
25
See id. §§ 1101-14.
26
See id. §§ 1051-85.
27
Id. § 1144(a). The preemption provision was expanded by the Conference
Committee just prior to Congress’s final approval of ERISA. See Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States To Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 977-85 (2000). “The original House-passed version of
20
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preted this provision when it held that ERISA preempts state law that
either “conflicts with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate
28
its objects.”
This expansive preemption provision creates gaps where the state
law addressing an issue is preempted, and ERISA does not itself con29
tain specific rules on the issue. Any gaps created by preemption are
to be filled by a court-developed “federal common law of rights and
30
obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.” All the courts that have
addressed the issue agree that ERISA preempts state law in connec31
tion with beneficiary waivers.
The important question is whether

ERISA and the original Senate version both contained a limited preemption clause
expressly tied to ERISA’s focus on pension regulation.” Id. at 978. The final version
preempted “all State laws insofar as they . . . relate to any employee benefit plan.” Id.
at 986 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)(1994)).
28
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841 (1997). Preemption is essential to achieving
the second purpose of ERISA. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (identifying
the second purpose of ERISA as providing for uniformity and simplicity in administration). The Supreme Court recognized the tie between expansive preemption and
Congress’s objective of simple plan administration in Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne:
It is . . . clear that ERISA’s pre-emption provision was prompted by recognition that employers establishing and maintaining employee benefit plans are
faced with the task of coordinating complex administrative activities. A
patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable inefficiencies
in benefit program operation, which might lead those employers with existing
plans to reduce benefits, and those without such plans to refrain from adopting them. Pre-emption ensures that the administrative practices of a benefit
plan will be governed by only a single set of regulations.
482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987).
29
ERISA’s wide-sweeping preemption “creates a ‘regulatory vacuum,’” which
could lead to “situation[s] of ‘almost palpable unfairness’” unless the federal courts
“develop federal common law remedies pursuant to ERISA in order to fill the vacuum.” Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Comment, ERISA Preemption and the Case for a Federal Common Law of Agency Governing Employer-Administrators, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 224 (2001).
Fairfield argues that the federal courts should adopt a common law of agency “that
conducts a fact-sensitive analysis of the relationship between the employee, the employer, and the insurer.” Id. at 225.
30
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (quoting Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987)).
31
See, e.g., McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, No. 05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007) (relying on Boggs, 520 U.S. at
841); Estate of Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 82 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that the issue of beneficiary waivers is governed by federal common law without
addressing the question of preemption); Mohamed v. Kerr, 53 F.3d 911, 913 (8th Cir.
1995) (noting that, while state law is preempted, “federal courts may look to state law
for guidance in developing federal common law”); Brandon v. Travelers Ins. Co., 18
F.3d 1321, 1325 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he designation of a beneficiary ‘relates to’ the
provision of an ERISA plan to a sufficient degree to be preempted by that statute.”);
Krishna v. Colgate Palmolive Co., 7 F.3d 11, 14-16 (2d Cir. 1993) (rejecting the use of
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ERISA specifically addresses beneficiary waivers, or if beneficiary waivers exist in one of the gaps created by preemption and should fall un32
der the purview of federal common law.
C. ERISA Provisions Applicable to the Debate over Beneficiary Waivers
33

ERISA has numerous provisions, two of which are particularly
relevant to waivers by beneficiaries: the fiduciary duties provision and
the anti-alienation provision.
1. Fiduciary Duties Provision
ERISA’s fiduciary duties provision, § 1104, details the responsibilities of a plan fiduciary—the plan administrator or trustee, for exam34
ple—as he performs his duties. Section 1104(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that
a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and—(A) for the exclusive
purpose of: (i) providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries;
and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan; . . .
and (D) in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan
insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with
35
[ERISA].

This provision, including the requirement that the plan administrator discharge his duties “in accordance with the [plan] docu36
ments,” applies to the plan administrator’s distribution of the death
37
benefit after the participant dies.
Because the plan administrator
must determine the proper beneficiary, the validity of a beneficiary’s

state law where the plan administrator interpleads claimants); Fox Valley & Vicinity
Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 278 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(“Because ERISA preempts state pension benefit laws, we must find the answer to this
issue within ERISA itself or in the federal common law interpreting ERISA.” (citation
omitted)); McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[ERISA’s] preemption provision is to be construed broadly . . . .”).
32
See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text (discussing the two approaches
courts have followed).
33
See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text (describing ERISA’s structure and
objectives).
34
29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2000).
35
Id. § 1104(a)(1) (emphasis added).
36
Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D).
37
ERISA plan administrators must make death distributions to beneficiaries. See
BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, § 150.06[11][c].
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waiver can become a contested issue in the death benefit distribu38
tion.
2. Anti-Alienation Provision
ERISA also contains an anti-alienation, or “spendthrift,” provision
39
in § 1056(d). The congressional policy behind this provision is “to
safeguard a stream of income for pensioners . . . and their depend40
ents.” The provision requires “[e]ach pension plan [to] provide that
41
benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”
The stated exception to this provision condones only two types of
transactions: (1) “any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to
42
exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment” and (2) the “assignment . . . of a right to any benefit payable with respect to a participant
43
pursuant to . . . a qualified domestic relations order,” or QDRO.

38

Determining the proper beneficiary can be a challenge when the beneficiary
form on file with the plan administrator designates an ex-spouse who has subsequently
waived her right to the benefits in a divorce property settlement. See, e.g., Fox Valley &
Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275, 282 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (holding that the divorcée effectively waived any interest in her husband’s pension and was not entitled to payment). Often, the plan administrator will file an interpleader action to determine the proper recipient of the death benefit. E.g., id. at 278.
39
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2000).
40
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 852 (1997) (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)). The Supreme Court in Boggs emphasized the objective of the anti-alienation provision by noting that it “‘can be seen to
bespeak a pension law protective policy of special intensity: Retirement funds shall
remain inviolate until retirement.’” Id. at 851 (quoting JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A.
WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 547 (2d ed. 1995)).
41
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1).
42
Id. § 1056(d)(2).
43
Id. § 1056(d)(3)(A). As one treatise explains:
A QDRO is a judgment, decree or order (including approval of a property settlement agreement) made pursuant to a state domestic relations law (i.e., divorce law) which relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments,
or marital property rights. In order to be “qualified”, the QDRO must:
• Create or recognize the existence of an alternate payee’s right, or assign
to an alternate payee the right, to receive all or a portion of a participant’s pension plan benefits.
• Not alter the amount or form or benefits otherwise payable under the
terms of the plan.
• Specify the name and last known mailing address of the participant and
any alternate payee covered by the QDRO.
• Specify the amount or percentage of the participant’s benefits to be paid
to the alternate payee, or, alternatively, the manner in which the amount
or percentage is to be calculated.
• Name the plan covered by the QDRO.
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The applicability of the anti-alienation provision often arises in
connection with beneficiary waivers of ERISA pension plan benefits.
The issue is whether a waiver is an “assignment or alienation,” and
44
thus only allowed if it satisfies one of the anti-alienation exceptions.
The first step in addressing this question is to define “assignment or
alienation.” Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the definition of these terms, it has referred to a regulation defining
an “assignment or alienation” as “‘[a]ny direct or indirect arrangement whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary’ an
interest enforceable against a plan to ‘all or any part of a plan benefit
payment which is, or may become, payable to the participant or bene45
ficiary.’”
II. THE MINORITY RULE
The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, and
Sixth Circuits support the minority rule—not giving effect to a waiver
of ERISA plan benefits by a beneficiary and, instead, relying solely on
46
the beneficiary designated on the participant’s beneficiary form.
The minority view relies on three primary arguments: (1) the plan
documents argument, (2) the efficiency and uniformity of administra47
tion argument, and (3) the anti-alienation argument.
•

Specify the number of payments or the period of time to which the
QDRO relates.
BACON & TUCKER, supra note 1, § 150.08[5][b]. The Retirement Equity Act of 1984
added the QDRO, QPSA, and QJSA provisions to ERISA in order to protect the interest of spouses in each other’s pension benefits. See Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426
(codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.) (stating the act’s purpose as amending ERISA to “provide for greater equity under private pension plans for workers and their
spouses and dependents by taking into account changes in work patterns, the status of
marriage as an economic partnership, and the substantial contribution to that partnership of spouses who work both in and outside the home”).
44
See, e.g., McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007) (emphasizing that a waiver,
though conceptually distinct from an “‘assignment or alienation[,]’ may nevertheless
be prohibited”).
45
Boggs, 520 U.S. at 851 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)–13(c)(1)(ii) (1997)).
46
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (citing relevant cases and observing that
the Sixth Circuit is the only circuit whose decisions comprehensively support the minority view). The minority rule has also garnered support from the Department of Labor in an amicus brief to the Supreme Court of Texas. Brief for the Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1213, Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721 (Tex. 2003) (No. 01-0447), 2002 WL 32349562.
47
See McGowan, 423 F.3d at 251 (Becker, J., concurring) (summarizing the majority opinion’s three primary arguments).
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A. The Plan Documents Argument: McMillan and Egelhoff
The plan documents argument interprets ERISA’s fiduciary duties
provision, § 1104, as requiring plan administrators to pay the beneficiary listed on the beneficiary form without consulting any other
48
documents to determine the correct beneficiary. The first federal
appellate court to endorse the minority rule based on the plan docu49
ments argument was the Sixth Circuit in McMillan v. Parrott.
McMillan is the paradigmatic beneficiary waiver case. Dr. Norman
50
Parrott was a participant in “two vested ERISA [pension] plans.” At
the time of his death, he was married to Claudia, who was his third
51
wife. However, the designated beneficiary on his ERISA plan docu52
ments was Barbara, his second wife.
Dr. Parrott had filed his beneficiary form four years prior to his
53
death, while he was still married to Barbara. Later that same year, he
54
and Barbara divorced, signing a property settlement agreement.
The agreement included “a broad waiver clause in which each spouse
relinquished ‘any and all’ claims he or she might have against the
55
other.”
After Dr. Parrott’s death, the plan administrator faced the question of which party was the proper beneficiary: Barbara or Dr.
56
Parrott’s estate? The plan administrator sought a declaratory judg57
ment from the district court to answer this question. The district
court responded with two rulings. First, Claudia, as the surviving
58
spouse, was entitled to a QPSA for fifty percent of the plan benefits;

48
See id. at 246 (arguing that the fiduciary duties provision “dictates that it is the
documents on file with the Plan, and not outside private agreements between beneficiaries and participants, that determine the rights of the parties”).
49
913 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1990).
50
Id. at 310.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 311.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. Later in the opinion, the court noted that even if it were to adopt the federal common law approach, the waiver in the property settlement agreement would
not be specific enough to be enforced because it did not “specifically refer to the
spouse’s rights as a beneficiary in an ERISA plan.” Id. at 312.
56
Id. at 311.
57
Id.
58
Id.; see also supra note 2 (discussing QPSAs). In summarizing the district court’s
decision, the Sixth Circuit cites Internal Revenue Code provisions 26 U.S.C. §§
401(a)(11)(A), 417(c)(2) (2000). McMillan, 913 F.2d at 311. The language in the In-

2007]

WAIVERS OF ERISA PLAN BENEFITS

727

and second, Barbara had waived her right to the other half of the plan
benefits through the waiver clause in the property settlement agree59
ment.
Barbara appealed the district court’s ruling as to the waiver, and
the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the divorce settlement was not
60
an effective waiver of Barbara’s rights as beneficiary. The Court of
Appeals based its holding on ERISA’s requirement that the “plan administrator discharge his duties ‘in accordance with the documents
61
and instruments governing the plan.’” The court noted that both
pension plans provided that “[e]ach Participant shall be given the opportunity in an original election to designate a Beneficiary and from
time to time the Participant may file with the Plan Administrator a
new or revised designation in such form as the Plan Administrator
62
shall provide.” The court then applied ERISA’s plan documents requirement to the beneficiary language of the plan, and concluded
63
that “the documents control, and those name Barbara Parrott.”
The McMillan court’s analysis is not unsupported. In Egelhoff v.
Egelhoff, the Supreme Court used similar reasoning to hold that ERISA
preempted a Washington statute that automatically revoked the des64
ignation of a spouse as the beneficiary of a nonprobate asset. Specifically, the Court found that the Washington statute
runs counter to ERISA’s commands that a plan shall “specify the basis on
which payments are made to and from the plan,” and that the fiduciary
shall administer the plan “in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan,” making payments to a “beneficiary” who
65
is “designated by a participant, or by the terms of [the] plan.”

ternal Revenue Code closely parallels ERISA’s QPSA provisions, 29 U.S.C. § 1055
(2000).
59
McMillan, 913 F.2d at 311. Claudia, Dr. Parrott’s children, and Dr. Parrott’s
estate reached a court-approved agreement dividing the remaining fifty percent of the
plan benefits. Id.
60
Id. at 312.
61
Id. at 311 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000)); see also supra notes 34-38
and accompanying text (discussing ERISA’s fiduciary duties provisions).
62
McMillan, 913 F.2d at 311.
63
Id. at 311-12.
64
532 U.S. 141, 144, 150 (2001). See generally Jonathan Dotson, Comment, Egelhoff v. Egelhoff: The Supreme Court’s Latest Attempt To Clarify ERISA Preemption and the
Decision’s Effect on Texas State Law, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 503 (2002) (discussing ERISA’s
express preemption of state law and the effects of Egelhoff).
65
Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147 (citations omitted) (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(8),
1102(b)(4), 1104(a)(1)(D) (2000)).
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Although the reasoning in Egelhoff is similar to the reasoning of
the plan documents approach to beneficiary waivers, several circuits
have declined to apply Egelhoff because its holding was based on the
preemption of state law rather than the application of federal com66
mon law.
B. The Efficiency and Uniformity of Administration Argument: Fox Valley
The efficiency and uniformity of administration argument is an
extension of the plan documents argument. The theory is that requiring the plan administrator to distribute the death benefit to the
named beneficiary furthers one of ERISA’s primary purposes: the
67
simple and uniform administration of pension plans. In his dissenting opinion in Fox Valley & Vicinity Construction Workers Pension Fund v.
Brown, Judge Easterbrook explained the benefits of such a bright-line
rule: “Rules requiring payment to named beneficiaries yield simple
administration, avoid double liability, and ensure that beneficiaries
get what’s coming quickly, without the folderol essential under less68
certain rules.”
C. The Anti-Alienation Argument: McGowan
The anti-alienation argument relies on ERISA’s anti-alienation
69
provision, § 1056(d). Because that provision is limited to pension

66

See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238, 242 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. denied sub nom. Finch v. Galaway, 544 U.S. 1056 (2005) (“[T]he holding of
Egelhoff is inapplicable to the present case because Egelhoff does not address the application of federal common law to ERISA plans. . . . This court sees no reason to extend
the scope of Egelhoff to find that it preempts federal common law in addition to state
statutes.”).
67
See McMillan, 913 F.2d at 312 (arguing that the plan documents approach “fulfills the intent of Congress that ERISA plans be uniform in their interpretation and
simple in their application”).
68
897 F.2d 275, 283 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The beneficiary
waiver issue is an example of a question impacted by theories of statutory interpretation. See Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter? A Case Study, 94
NW. U. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (2000) (citing Fox Valley as an example of a case that reflects
the divergent theories of statutory interpretation of Judges Easterbrook and Posner).
Judge Easterbrook is well known for his textualist view of statutory interpretation. Id.
at 1409. In contrast, Judge Posner, who joined the majority in Fox Valley, is recognized
as taking a pragmatic view of statutory interpretation. Id.
69
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (2000); see also supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text
(discussing ERISA’s anti-alienation provision).
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70

plans, this argument applies only to such plans. As of the writing of
71
this Comment, McGowan v. NJR Service Corp. is the most recent beneficiary waiver case decided by a federal appellate court based on the
anti-alienation argument.
Although the Third Circuit adopted the minority rule in
McGowan, the nature of the opinion provides insight into the complex
and uncertain law surrounding beneficiary waivers. Judge Van Antwerpen wrote the main opinion holding in favor of the minority rule,
and he was persuaded by all three of the common arguments: antialienation, plan documents, and efficiency and uniformity of admini72
stration. Judge Becker concurred with the principal opinion’s approval of the anti-alienation argument, but he rejected the other two
73
arguments.
Judge Fuentes, rejecting all three arguments, dis74
sented. The result was a 2-1 decision in favor of the minority rule,
with a controlling holding based on the anti-alienation argument.
Since this argument can apply only to pension plans, the Third Circuit’s analysis supports the minority rule concerning pension plan
beneficiary waivers and the federal common law rule with respect to
75
welfare plan beneficiary waivers.
The factual situation in McGowan is different from that in
76
McMillan.
Shortly before he retired from New Jersey Natural Gas
70

29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (“Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided
under the plan may not be assigned or alienated.”(emphasis added)).
71
423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed, 74 U.S.L.W. 3407 (U.S. Jan. 3,
2006) (No. 05-853).
72
Id. at 245-50.
73
Id. at 253-55 (Becker, J., concurring).
74
Id. at 255-60 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
75
The only position the Third Circuit panel clearly adopted was in support of the
minority rule for pension plan beneficiary waivers. The McGowan opinion could be
interpreted to suggest the federal common law approach for welfare plans, because the
anti-alienation argument applies only to pension plans. Supra note 70 and accompanying text. However, this is not the Third Circuit’s holding in McGowan, and it is not
clear that the judges considered the impact of their reasoning on welfare plan beneficiary waivers.
76
McGowan “arises in [the] unusual factual context” of an attempted change to
the survivor beneficiary of a QJSA after the participant has retired and annuity payments have commenced. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Denial of Certiorari at 7-8, McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., No. 05-853 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2006/2pet/6invit/2005-0853.pet.ami.inv.pdf.
The factual situation in McGowan does not lend itself to the application of the federal
common law rule because, unlike waivers outside the postretirement QJSA context,
ERISA contains specific provisions detailing the requirements for a spouse to waive an
interest in a QJSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000 & Supp. III 2003); see also Brief of the
United States as Amicus Curiae, supra, at 10 (“[A] federal common law rule requiring
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Company (NJNG), McGowan elected to receive the retirement benefits he had accrued in NJNG’s retirement plan “in the form of an
‘automatic surviving spouse option,’ creating a 50% survivor annuity
77
for Rosemary,” who was his wife at the time. Two years later, in conjunction with their divorce, Rosemary and McGowan entered a “Marital Settlement Agreement,” in which Rosemary “waiv[ed] any and all
rights, title, interest or claims . . . to all bank accounts, life insurance
policies and any right to the New Jersey Gas Company Employee Pen78
sion Plan of the Husband.” McGowan then contacted the plan administrator to change the “named survivor beneficiary” from Rose79
mary, his second wife, to Shirley, his first wife. McGowan presented
the plan administrator with a form, which Rosemary had signed, that
reflected Rosemary’s consent to the change in beneficiary. But the
80
plan administrator refused the request. Three years later, McGowan
again sought a change, this time to benefit Donna, his third and cur81
rent wife.
After the plan administrator again denied his request,
McGowan sued to compel the plan “to recognize Rosemary’s waiver
82
and the subsequent nomination of Donna as the new beneficiary.”

the plan to recognize the waiver in this situation would affirmatively conflict with ERISA by purporting to determine rights to a survivor’s annuity in a manner not authorized by the QJSA provisions in 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2000 & Supp. III 2003) or the QDRO
provisions in 29 U.S.C. 1056(d)(3).”). Despite its unique factual circumstances,
McGowan is relevant to the subject of this Comment because the McGowan court did
not premise its analysis on the QJSA waiver provisions, but rather on arguments generally applicable to the waiver of ERISA benefits.
77
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 243.
78
Id. Note the specificity of the waiver in McGowan compared to the broader
waiver in McMillan v. Parrott, 913 F.2d 310, 311 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[E]ach spouse relinquished ‘any and all’ claims he or she might have against the other.”). See supra note
55 (discussing the need for a waiver to be sufficiently specific in order to be enforced).
Judge Fuentes closed his dissenting opinion in McGowan with the following observation:
Although in some cases there may be a dispute over whether particular language in a divorce settlement is specific and definite enough to constitute
waiver of a pension benefit, there is no serious dispute here as to whether
Rosemary’s waiver was insufficient. It clearly identified the Plan and waives all
rights to benefits under the Plan. Accordingly, I would give effect to Rosemary’s waiver.
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 260 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 243.
80
Id. The administrator’s reason for the denial was that “the Plan did not permit
changes to [McGowan’s] prior contingent beneficiary election once he started receiving benefit payments.” Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 244.
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plan,
and the Third Circuit affirmed, relying on the minority rule and the
83
anti-alienation argument. The court held that, although “as a general matter . . . ‘waiver’ is not the same thing as assignment or alienation,” Rosemary’s beneficiary waiver “creates an ‘indirect arrangement’ whereby the Plan benefits are transferred to Donna, who in
84
turn gains an ‘interest enforceable against the plan.’” Using the definition of an assignment or alienation that the Supreme Court had
85
referenced in Boggs, the court found that the waiver was an assignment or alienation in contravention of ERISA’s anti-alienation provi86
sion. The court bolstered its conclusion that a beneficiary waiver is
87
an alienation with an analysis of ERISA’s QDRO provisions. Judge
Van Antwerpen reasoned that “the QDRO provision, which recognizes
the right to designate alternate payees under certain circumstances,
‘give[s] rise to the strong implication that’ the designation of alternate payees under other circumstances (i.e. through waivers) is ‘not
88
consistent with the statutory scheme.’” Judge Becker, in his concurring opinion, observed that
Congress saw QDROs as the only means by which a participant or beneficiary could assign or alienate his or her interest in the plan. This is
confirmed by the language from the 1984 Senate Report noting that, absent a QDRO, the participant’s first spouse is still entitled to benefits
89
upon the participant’s death.

The reasoning employed by Judges Van Antwerpen and Becker in
McGowan is representative of the anti-alienation argument in the minority rule decisions.

83

Id. at 244, 250; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (describing the limited nature of the Third Circuit’s holding).
84
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 248, 249 (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)–13(c)(1)(ii)
(1997)).
85
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 851 (1997); see also supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s reference in Boggs to 26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)13(c)(1)(ii) (1997)).
86
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 248.
87
Id. at 249-50; id. at 251-52 (Becker, J., concurring).
88
Id. at 250 (quoting Boggs, 520 U.S. at 847). Judge Van Antwerpen’s statement is
not a clear implication of the Supreme Court’s discussion in Boggs. See McGowan, 423
F.3d at 252 n.8 (Becker, J., concurring) (“While I . . . believ[e] that Judge Van Antwerpen correctly interprets the Supreme Court’s discussion of the QDRO provision in
Boggs . . . I feel constrained to note that the Supreme Court’s congressional silence jurisprudence is somewhat of a patchwork.” (citations omitted)).
89
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 251-52 (Becker, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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III. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW APPROACH
The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have adopted the
federal common law approach—ruling that ERISA does not specifically address beneficiary waivers and applying federal common law to
90
give effect to beneficiary waivers if the waivers meet certain criteria.
These courts have rejected the plan documents argument, the efficiency and uniformity argument, and the anti-alienation argument
91
(the latter being relevant only in pension plan cases). Instead, they
92
apply federal common law to decide whether the waiver is effective.
A. Requirements for an Effective Waiver
The federal common law rule that the courts have applied to determine whether a beneficiary waiver is effective has been consistent
93
across these circuits. “That rule is that a named ERISA beneficiary
may waive his or her entitlement to the proceeds of an ERISA
plan . . . , provided that the waiver is explicit, voluntary, and made in
94
good faith.” Previously, there had been some differences in the in95
terpretation of the federal common law rule, but those differences
96
have been resolved.
90

See supra note 5 (citing cases adopting the federal common law approach).
Nearly all of the state appellate courts that have addressed the issue have held in favor
of the federal common law approach. E.g., MacInnes v. MacInnes, 677 N.W.2d 889,
893 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Strong v. Omaha Constr. Indus. Pension Plan, 701 N.W.2d
320, 328-29 (Neb. 2005) (per curiam); Silber v. Silber, 786 N.E.2d 1263, 1268-69 (N.Y.
2003); Keen v. Weaver, 121 S.W.3d 721, 724-27 (Tex. 2003). See generally Anthony J.
Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825
(2005) (discussing the role of state courts in the development of federal common law).
91
See, e.g., Estate of Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir.
1996) (rejecting the plan documents, efficiency and uniformity, and anti-alienation
arguments).
92
E.g., Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d
275, 281 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Trs. of Iron Workers Local 451 Annuity Fund v.
O’Brien, 937 F. Supp. 346, 350-51 (D. Del. 1996).
93
Mohamed v. Kerr, 53 F.3d 911, 914-17 (8th Cir. 1995) and Brandon v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 18 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1994) perform a thorough analysis of the
federal common law approach across the circuits and reach a similar formulation of
the general federal common law rule.
94
Manning v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 2000).
95
In Estate of Altobelli v. International Business Machines Corp., Chief Judge Wilkinson
noted the differences in the federal common law rule in his dissenting opinion:
[P]lan administrators will have to assess whether the waiver is executed with
sufficient specificity to trump the beneficiary designation in the plan documents. Courts have reached contradictory conclusions in such situations.
Compare Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1989) (term stating
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B. Rejecting the Plan Documents Argument
The courts that reject the plan documents argument have a simple refrain: ERISA “does not either expressly or implicitly purport to
establish any methodology for determining the beneficiary of an ER97
ISA plan.” The plan documents argument is premised on a combi98
nation of three different ERISA sections. The most critical, § 1104,
is a section on plan administrators’ fiduciary duties, not a section on
99
distributions to beneficiaries.
Judge Becker, concurring in
McGowan, noted that the fiduciary duties provision “simply embodies
the common-sense notion that a plan administrator should not take
100
actions that are inconsistent with the plan’s guidelines.”
Judge
Becker bolstered this argument by sagely pointing out that “[n]othing
in the language [of § 1104] prohibits the administrator from consulting other documents, insofar as those documents do not conflict with
the language of the plan. Indeed, an administrator must consult

that husband “shall have as his own, free of any interest of [his wife], his interest in the profit-sharing plan of his employer” held not to waive wife’s beneficiary interest in plan), with Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 275 (term stating that the
parties “waive any interest or claim in and to any retirement, pension, profitsharing and/or annuity plans resulting from the employment of the other
party” held to waive wife’s beneficiary interest in pension plan).
77 F.3d at 83 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting).
96
See Mohamed, 53 F.3d at 915 (noting that the issue driving the difference in the
federal common law rule has been resolved and that case law now “makes it clear that
the law does not require that the word ‘beneficiary’ appear in the language of the
agreement in order for a beneficiary interest to be divested”); see also Clift v. Clift, 210
F.3d 268, 270-72 (5th Cir. 2000) (analyzing Lyman and Fox Valley in its determination of
the language sufficient to constitute a waiver under the federal common law rule and
coming to the same conclusion as Mohamed).
97
Manning, 212 F.3d at 872; see also Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 280 (“ERISA is silent on
the issue of what constitutes a proper waiver . . . .”).
98
These provisions are 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002, 1102, 1104 (2000). See supra note 65
and accompanying text (setting out the plan documents argument).
99
See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (discussing § 1104). Section 1104
alone “is a very thin reed upon which to find complete conflict preemption.” Manning,
212 F.3d at 872.
100
McGowan v. NJR Serv. Corp., 423 F.3d 241, 254 (3d Cir. 2005) (Becker, J., concurring), cert. denied, No. 05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007); see also Manning,
212 F.3d at 872 (“Section 1104 defines the fiduciary duties owed by the plan administrator to plan participants and beneficiaries.”). The title of § 1104(a), “Prudent man
standard of care,” 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (2000), lends additional support to the argument that § 1104 is intended to protect plan participants from rogue plan administrators rather than to describe detailed procedures for how plan administrators should
carry out their daily tasks.
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other documents to determine whether a participant has obtained a
101
valid QDRO.”
In the wake of Egelhoff, some argue that the view that the plan
documents approach does not specifically address beneficiary waivers
102
has been invalidated.
But this argument confuses the preemption
of state law with the preemption of federal common law, and there is
103
no reason to believe Egelhoff intended the latter.
Given ERISA’s
broad preemption clause, there will be many cases in which ERISA
“relates to” an issue but does not specifically address the issue; this is
104
where the need for federal common law arises.
C. Rejecting the Efficiency and Uniformity of Administration Argument
The efficiency and uniformity of administration argument claims
that plan administrators will be overburdened by having to look at
property settlement agreements and decide if they contain a valid
105
waiver of a beneficiary’s rights to ERISA plan benefits.
There are
two primary counterarguments to this view. First, “[n]o such additional burdens will be imposed because, under the ERISA statutory
scheme, a plan administrator must investigate the marital history of a
participant and determine whether any domestic relations orders exist
106
that could affect the distribution of benefits.”
Second, since there
101

McGowan, 423 F.3d at 254 (Becker, J., concurring). Judge Becker explained:
[T]he provision authorizing QDROs explicitly states that such orders are exempt from ERISA’s anti-alienation clause but says nothing whatsoever about
§ 1104(a)(1)(D). This suggests that Congress simply did not see a conflict between the requirement that plan administrators perform their duties “in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan” and the
requirement that they give effect to a transfer of benefits pursuant to a
QDRO . . . .
Id.; see also supra note 43 (defining a QDRO as a “judgment, decree or order . . . made
pursuant to a state domestic relations law” and listing QDRO qualification criteria).
102
See, e.g., Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Finch, 395 F.3d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir.
2004), cert. denied sub nom. Finch v. Galaway, 544 U.S. 1056 (2005) (discussing Egelhoff’s
effect on beneficiary waivers); see also supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (discussing Egelhoff and its applicability to beneficiary waivers).
103
See Finch, 395 F.3d at 242 (“This court sees no reason to extend the scope of
Egelhoff to find that it preempts federal common law in addition to state statutes.”).
104
See Manning, 212 F.3d at 870-71 (noting that the need to apply federal common
law arises when ERISA does not specifically address an issue).
105
See McGowan, 423 F.3d at 247 (“It cannot be denied that requiring administrators to review contractual language under an amorphous ‘reasonable person’ standard
will create a risk of litigation and administrative burdens . . . .”).
106
Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275,
282 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc). In fact, Fox Valley “arose from just such an investiga-
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appears to have been no significant litigation in the circuits adopting
the federal common law approach over plan administrators’ improper
interpretation of waivers, perhaps the task presents no serious diffi107
culty for plan administrators.
If administrative burdens are minimal, the efficiency and uniformity of administration argument provides little support for choosing the minority rule over the federal
common law approach.
D. Rejecting the Anti-Alienation Argument
The circuits adopting the federal common law approach have rejected the anti-alienation argument by asserting that a waiver is not an
108
assignment or alienation.
“Waiver does not involve a transfer of

tion.” Id. The efficiency argument primarily concerns additional work—identifying
waivers and determining if they are effective. Both sides of the argument acknowledge
that there would be some additional administrative work in beneficiary waiver situations, such as additional actuarial calculations, but “[t]hese kinds of calculations are de
rigeur for plan administrators.” McGowan, 423 F.3d at 255 (Becker, J., concurring).
Judge Becker argued that minor administrative inconvenience is not a persuasive efficiency argument. Id.
107
Although this is difficult to observe directly, the best argument that waiver interpretation imposes a significant administrative burden is the development of federal
common law in response to Lyman Lumber Co. v. Hill, 877 F.2d 692 (8th Cir. 1989). See
supra notes 95-96 (discussing the Lyman issue and its resolution); McGowan, 423 F.3d at
247 (pointing only to Lyman-related litigation as evidence of increased administrative
burden). With the resolution of the Lyman issue, however, this increased burden does
not remain a concern. Anecdotal evidence seems to support the conclusion that there
are no longer significant administrative costs involved in reviewing purported waivers:
Must a plan take every purported waiver into court in order to figure out
whether it applies to the beneficiary designation? We don’t have a satisfying
response to this objection, other than to note [that] in our own practice we
have been able to solve dozens of beneficiary disputes without yet having been
forced into an interpleader action. We acknowledge, however, that, while one
can theoretically assert that the plan’s cost in determining the correct payee
can be charged against the proceeds otherwise payable to the beneficiary, as a
practical matter there will be some costs that cannot be avoided if the plan is
forced to examine divorce decrees.
Who Is the Payee, Part VIII: Altobelli v. IBM and the Other Beneficiary Waiver Cases, ERISA
LITIG. REPTR., Aug. 1996, 14, 17 [hereinafter Who Is the Payee].
108
See, e.g., Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 279 (“These provisions focus on the assignment
or alienation of benefits by a participant, not the waiver of a right to payment of benefits made by a designated beneficiary.”). In addition to distinguishing waivers from
assignments, some of the early federal common law decisions, such as Fox Valley, attempt to discredit the anti-alienation argument by asserting that the anti-alienation
provisions apply only to participants, not to beneficiaries. Id. Boggs seems to suggest
that the anti-alienation provision applies equally to participants and beneficiaries.
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 258 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
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109

rights; it is merely a relinquishment.”
The most plausible counterargument is that, in certain situations, a waiver combined with a sub110
sequent beneficiary designation functions as an indirect assignment.
Judge Easterbrook noted this possibility in his Fox Valley dissent: “The
designated beneficiary may give away the money the instant she receives it. Waiver is an anticipatory gift, to whoever is next in line un111
der the Fund’s rules . . . .”
Judge Fuentes, dissenting in McGowan,
recognized the problem with this argument: “[S]uch a reading allows
third-party actions to invalidate what would otherwise be valid waivers.
Indeed, the majority would appear to prohibit all waivers, even
112
though, in many cases, there will be no ‘renomination’ at issue.”
An examination of ERISA policy further supports a rejection of
the anti-alienation argument. In Estate of Altobelli v. International Business Machines Corp., the Fourth Circuit observed that waiver is consistent with ERISA’s purposes:
We agree with the Seventh Circuit [in Fox Valley] that the anti-alienation
clause does not apply to a beneficiary’s waiver. As the Supreme Court
has noted, the purpose of the clause is “to safeguard a stream of income
for pensioners (and their dependents . . . ).” To bar a waiver in favor of
113
the pensioner himself would not advance that purpose.

Furthermore, the courts have interpreted the legislative intent
behind the anti-alienation provision to be the protection of plan
benefits from creditors and “unscrupulous predators preying upon
participants and beneficiaries by offering inadequate immediate gratification in exchange for the long-term benefits ERISA is designed to
114
guarantee.”
“These concerns are not nearly as strong with respect
to waiver” as they are with respect to assignment, where the benefits
115
are transferred to a third party.
The anti-alienation argument does
not provide support for a bright-line rule preventing the recognition
of all beneficiary waivers of ERISA plan benefits.

109

McGowan, 423 F.3d at 256 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (describing such a scenario in
McGowan).
111
Fox Valley, 897 F.2d at 282-83 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
112
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 257 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). Judge Fuentes noted that if
the combination of waiver and renomination is what results in the violation of the antialienation provision, then only the renomination should be invalidated. Id.
113
77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365, 376 (1990)) (internal citation omitted).
114
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 256 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
115
Id.
110
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IV. THE OPTIMAL APPROACH
The federal common law approach is the best approach to beneficiary waivers of ERISA plan benefits because it is in accord with
ERISA’s statutory language and provides equitable results consistent
with ERISA’s purpose. Moreover, from a practical perspective, the
federal common law approach is the best of the available options and
does not generate the absurd consequences of the minority rule.
A. The Federal Common Law Approach Provides Equitable Results
That Are Consistent with ERISA’s Primary Purpose
The federal common law approach is preferable to the minority
rule because it is consistent with the overriding purpose of ERISA: to
ensure that employees “receive the pensions and other benefits that
116
they were led to believe they would receive upon retirement.”
By
adhering to this principle, ERISA is intended to generate equitable
outcomes, an aim that is reflected in both the legislative history and
the statute itself. The legislative history indicates that ERISA “is concerned with improving the fairness and effectiveness of qualified re117
tirement plans in their vital role of providing retirement income.”
ERISA’s § 1001, titled “Congressional findings and declaration of policy,” clearly states that Congress enacted the statute because “it is . . .
desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, for the
protection of the revenue of the United States, and to provide for the
free flow of commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring
118
the equitable character of such plans and their financial soundness.”
The Retirement Equity Act of 1984 (REA) confirms ERISA’s equitable
focus by stating that REA’s purpose in amending ERISA was to “pro-

116

Ryan P. Barry, Comment, ERISA’s Purpose: The Conveyance of Information from
Trustee to Beneficiary, 31 CONN. L. REV. 735, 735 (1999) (citing Welfare and Pension Plan
Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 2 and H.R. 462 Before the H. Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm.
on Educ. and Labor, Part 2, 93d Cong. 1 (1973) (statement of Rep. John H. Dent,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Labor)). According to one of ERISA’s co-sponsors, Senator
Jacob K. Javits, ERISA is “a pension ‘bill of rights.’” 120 CONG. REC. 29935 (1974)
(statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits). ERISA’s focus on providing benefits to those expecting the benefits underlies numerous ERISA provisions. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520
U.S. 833, 852 (1997) (“Besides the anti-alienation provision, Congress has enacted
other protective measures to guarantee that retirement funds are there when a plan’s
participants and beneficiaries expect them.”).
117
H.R. REP. NO. 93-807, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4676.
118
29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2000) (emphasis added).

738

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 717

vide for greater equity under private pension plans for workers and
119
their spouses.”
The greatest benefit of the federal common law approach is that it
furthers ERISA’s primary purpose by ensuring that plan participants
and beneficiaries receive the benefits they are expecting. Suppose,
for example, that an ex-spouse who previously waived any claim to retirement benefits now seeks those benefits at the expense of a surviv120
ing spouse.
The deceased spouse and the surviving spouse likely
planned their retirement with the expectation that the surviving
spouse would receive the benefits at issue upon the deceased spouse’s
death. In contrast, the ex-spouse could not reasonably expect to receive the benefits after having waived any claim to them. Applying the
federal common law approach guarantees that the person with the
reasonable expectation of receiving the benefits actually receives
them.
There are several colorable responses to the expectations argument. First, one might argue that, although ERISA’s primary purpose
is to ensure that participants and beneficiaries receive the benefits
they are expecting, the person whose expectations might otherwise be
frustrated is the surviving spouse, and a surviving spouse is neither a
participant nor a beneficiary. While this argument may be technically
accurate, it ignores the fact that ERISA places the spouses of participants in a protected class. The QPSA and QJSA demonstrate Con121
gress’s intent to protect participants’ spouses.
Moreover, the argument ignores the fact that not recognizing the waiver would thwart the
participant’s expectation that the benefits would be available to support the surviving spouse.
The second counterargument one might make is that, in some
cases, the participant’s decision not to change the beneficiary designated in the plan documents indicates that the participant intended
the ex-spouse to remain a beneficiary, and that this imputed intention

119

Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.)
(emphasis added).
120
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text (discussing this scenario).
121
See supra note 2 (discussing ERISA’s QPSA and QJSA provisions). The QPSA
and QJSA provisions reveal that Congress wanted to provide a participant’s spouse the
right to at least fifty percent of the participant’s plan benefits at the expense of other
rightful beneficiaries. How Congress might have viewed the rights of surviving spouses
vis-à-vis named beneficiaries who waived any claim to benefits is debatable.
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renders reasonable an ex-spouse’s expectation of benefits.
This argument presumes without justification that the decision not to change
the beneficiary in the plan documents was a conscious one. Further,
the argument depends on the additional improbable assumption that,
although the participant and ex-spouse have signed a divorce agreement with a specific waiver of ERISA plan benefits, the participant
changed his mind and neither the participant nor the ex-spouse
thought it was necessary to take any action to ensure the ex-spouse received the benefits—other than to not change the beneficiary who
had been designated on the predivorce plan documents. While the
objections to the expectations argument are plausible, ultimately they
are unpersuasive.
The federal common law approach honors the intentions of the
123
parties and generates equitable outcomes.
The minority rule consistently disregards the intentions of participants and beneficiaries in
favor of the plan documents, thereby creating inequitable out124
comes.
While the adherence to plan documents and the simple
administration of ERISA plans are important goals of the legislative
scheme, they are not the primary reasons why Congress enacted ERISA. The minority rule opts for strained interpretations of ERISA’s
detailed provisions while ignoring its primary purpose, and the opinions written by judges who advocate for the minority rule clearly emphasize the preeminence of simple administration and adherence to
plan documents over equitable outcomes. In his dissenting opinion
in Fox Valley, Judge Ripple stated, “ERISA’s command that a plan be
administered in accordance with the plan’s documents must be our
125
primary concern in fashioning a waiver rule.”
This reasoning disregards ERISA’s primary purpose in favor of its secondary goals.
122

See Norwood, supra note 3, at 96-97 (discussing the problem of determining the
participant’s intentions when the ex-spouse asserts that the participant intended the
ex-spouse to remain the beneficiary despite a waiver in a divorce agreement).
123
The federal common law test, unlike the minority bright-line rule, looks to the
intent of the parties. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (setting out the requirements under federal common law for an ERISA beneficiary to waive her entitlements); see also, e.g., Estate of Altobelli v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 77 F.3d 78, 81 (4th
Cir. 1996) (“Congress’s provision for QDROs reveals that, in some situations, it deems
the intent of the parties sufficiently important to override the policy of simplified administration.”).
124
See, e.g., Altobelli, 77 F.3d at 82 (Wilkinson, C.J., dissenting) (“Here, the equities
of the majority’s disposition seem tempting, but ERISA’s provisions compel a contrary
outcome.”).
125
Fox Valley & Vicinity Constr. Workers Pension Fund v. Brown, 897 F.2d 275,
284 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Ripple, J., dissenting).
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B. The Federal Common Law Approach Conforms to ERISA’s
Statutory Language and Legislative History
In addition to being compatible with ERISA’s primary purpose,
the federal common law approach is consistent with ERISA’s language
and its legislative history. Specifically, the federal common law approach is not in conflict with ERISA’s plan documents and antialienation provisions.
1. Addressing the Plan Documents Argument
The plan documents provision does not prevent the use of the
federal common law approach. As Judge Becker recognized in
McGowan, the plan documents provision is concerned with fiduciary
126
duties and does not prevent the use of outside documents.
Judge
Becker observed that the allowance for outside documents in effecting
QDROs shows that Congress did not see a conflict between the plan
documents provision and the use of outside documents in deciding
127
who should receive payment of ERISA benefits.
Furthermore,
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc. indicates that the Supreme Court did not see a conflict between the plan documents provision and requiring plan administrators to consult garnishment orders in determining who should receive ERISA welfare plan
128
benefits.
The plan documents provision is purely a fiduciary duties provision and is not relevant to the determination of whether a nonparticipant waiver of benefits should be recognized. The attempts to
make the statutory language relevant to the analysis of nonparticipant
waivers require an unduly broad interpretation of the plan documents
provision that precludes the plan administrator from consulting any
outside documents. This interpretation is untenable, given that both

126

423 F.3d at 254 (Becker, J., concurring); see supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text (providing Judge Becker’s explanation of why ERISA provisions allow the
consultation of additional documents).
127
McGowan, 423 F.3d at 254 (Becker, J., concurring).
128
486 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1988) (“Unfortunately, ERISA itself offers no express answer as to whether welfare benefit plan trustees must comply with garnishment orders
like those respondent is seeking to enforce. In our view, however, certain ERISA provisions, and several aspects of the statute’s structure, indicate that Congress did not
intend to forbid the use of state-law mechanisms of executing judgments against
ERISA welfare benefit plans, even when those mechanisms prevent plan participants
from receiving their benefits.”).
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Congress and the Supreme Court have sanctioned actions that require
plan administrators to consult outside documents.
2. Addressing the Anti-Alienation Argument
The anti-alienation provision also does not preclude adopting the
federal common law approach to the waiver of ERISA plan benefits.
Beyond the clear-cut position that a waiver simply is not an assignment
129
or alienation, at least two other arguments suggest that the antialienation provision does not prevent waivers: (1) the REA’s legislative history calls into question any definition of an assignment or
alienation under ERISA that includes waivers; and (2) the IRS’s internal position is that disclaimers by named beneficiaries of ERISA pension plans after the participant’s death do not violate ERISA’s antialienation provision.
Legislative history indicates that the Congress enacting the REA
did not view a QDRO as conflicting with ERISA’s anti-alienation provision. The Senate Committee Report on the REA states that “[i]n the
case of a [QDRO], the bill clarifies that such order does not result in a
prohibited assignment or alienation of benefits under the spendthrift
130
provisions of the Code or ERISA.”
The use of “clarifies” indicates
that the 1984 Congress did not view the anti-alienation provision as
131
applying to QDROs, even prior to the adoption of the REA. Significantly, this suggests that the 1984 Congress viewed the anti-alienation
132
provision as containing certain inherent exceptions.
Moreover, this
interpretation of ERISA’s legislative history weighs heavily against the
argument that the 1984 Congress intended QDROs to be the only ex129

See supra notes 108-112 and accompanying text (citing opinions that distinguish
waivers from alienations and assignments).
130
S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 3 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2547, 2549
(emphasis added).
131
But see Mackey, 486 U.S. at 839-40 (cautioning that determining the intent of a
prior Congress based on the belief of a subsequent Congress is potentially “hazardous”
(quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960))).
132
The 1984 Congress’s use of “clarifies” suggests inherent exceptions to the antialienation provision when one considers that the 1984 Congress’s action closely followed case law recognizing an exception to the anti-alienation provision for intrafamilial transfers. See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. First Va. Bank of Tidewater, 698 F.2d 688,
690 (4th Cir. 1983) (“A judicial exception has been carved out of this seemingly absolute prohibition. If the debt is support due the employee’s spouse or children, his interest in the plan is subject to garnishment. The exception is premised upon the statute’s broad purpose to provide protection for employees and their families, so that
intra-familial transfers are not to be viewed in the same light as an involuntary transfer
for the benefit of a third-party creditor.” (citations omitted)).
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ception to the anti-alienation provision with respect to divorce situations.
The IRS’s General Counsel Memorandum (GCM) 39,858 states
that disclaimers by named beneficiaries of ERISA pension plans after
the participant’s death do not violate ERISA’s anti-alienation provi133
sion.
This internal IRS position, while not authoritative, is persuasive in its argument that disclaimers are not assignments or alien134
ations.
GCM 39,858 concludes that “a disclaimer of benefits under
a qualified plan does not constitute a prohibited ‘assignment or alien135
ation’ of plan benefits” under ERISA.
It notes that numerous areas
136
of the law agree that waivers and disclaimers are not transfers, and it
finds “no evidence that Congress intended to preclude a spouse from
disclaiming or renouncing benefits under a qualified plan payable af137
ter the participant’s death.”
C. Assessing the Available Approaches to Beneficiary Waivers
Although the minority rule and the federal common law approach
are the two primary positions on the issue of beneficiary waivers, there
138
are several intermediate approaches between the pure minority rule
139
on one hand, and the pure federal common law approach on the
other. The spectrum of intermediate approaches includes (1) the
140
minority rule plus the use of constructive trusts, (2) the McGowan

133

I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,858 (Sept. 23, 1991).
See Who Is the Payee, supra note 107, at 16-17 (“[T]he drafters of the GCM . . .
concluded that a valid disclaimer should not be regarded as a [sic] alienation for purposes of ERISA.”).
135
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,858 (“Because the disclaimant is regarded as never
having accepted or received the disclaimed property, the disclaimer is not considered
to involve a transfer of property by the disclaimant.”).
136
In support of its conclusion, GCM 39,858 found that a disclaimer is not considered a transfer under the Bankruptcy Code, the Uniform Probate Code, or trust law.
Id.
137
Id. Specifically, GCM 39,858 states that “Congress determined that the spouse
‘. . . should be involved in making choices with respect to retirement income on which
the spouse may also rely. . . .’” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-575, at 12 (1984)).
138
See supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing the minority rule).
139
See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the federal common law
approach).
140
See Norwood, supra note 3, at 97-101 (suggesting an application of the minority
rule plus the use of constructive trusts to prevent unfair results); see also Unicare Life &
Health Ins. Co. v. Craig, 157 F. App’x. 787, 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (Gibson, J., concurring) (suggesting the use of a constructive trust to remedy a possibly inequitable outcome resulting from an analogous ERISA dispute).
134
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rule (the federal common law rule for welfare plans and the minority
141
rule for pension plans), and (3) the federal common law approach
142
without allowing renomination after a waiver.
Although the intermediate approaches have a number of benefits
worth noting, these benefits ultimately are outweighed by their attendant problems. The minority rule plus the use of constructive trusts
under state law prevents unfair results and has additional advantages.
First, the “plan administrator’s responsibilities are uniform and un143
complicated,” because the plan administrator only needs to pay the
beneficiary specified on the beneficiary form. Second, an equitable
outcome remains available because a state court can apply a construc144
tive trust to “fashion an equitable result.”
While at first glance this approach is appealing, further examination reveals several flaws. One is that the process of administering and
obtaining plan benefits is not simple in practice. Take, for example,
an inequitable case in which a constructive trust will ultimately be applied to the plan assets. Under the federal common law rule, the plan
administrator would look at the proposed waiver, determine its validity under established federal common law, and distribute the plan
benefits to the appropriate beneficiary. Under the constructive trust
rule, the plan administrator will pay the plan benefits to the wrong
person. Then the proper beneficiary will have to rush to file a state
constructive trust claim, wait while litigating the claim, and later—
finally—receive the plan benefits.
The second, and most important, flaw of the constructive trust
approach is that imposing a constructive trust is inconsistent with the
145
minority rule. The rationale behind the minority rule is that ERISA

141

See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing McGowan and its implica-

tions).
142

See supra note 112 and accompanying text (noting that invalidating a renomination may prevent a waiver from violating the anti-alienation provision).
143
Norwood, supra note 3, at 100. Norwood also notes an additional benefit for
the administrator—he would no longer be a party to litigation disputing the proper
recipient. Id.
144
Id.
145
See Dotson, supra note 64, at 535 (“If allowed, the imposition of a constructive
trust is nothing more than a back door method of frustrating ERISA’s purpose of protecting named plan beneficiaries.”); see also T.P. Gallanis, ERISA and the Law of Succession, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 185, 193 (2004) (“Constructive trusts are creatures of state law,
and the decisions of the Supreme Court have made it clear that ERISA’s preemption
provision trumps the application of contrary state law.”).

744

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 155: 717

146

speaks directly to the waiver and disallows it.
If ERISA directly addresses an issue, then any state law on the issue, including constructive
147
trust law, is preempted.
Thus, constructive trust law cannot be applied, even after the plan benefits have been distributed. The Supreme Court in Boggs emphasized this in its concluding paragraph:
“It does not matter that respondents have sought to enforce their
rights only after the retirement benefits have been distributed since
their asserted rights are based on the theory that they had an interest
in the undistributed pension plan benefits. Their state-law claims are
148
pre-empted.”
Thus, the minority rule plus the use of constructive
trusts under state law is not a viable approach to the problem of beneficiary waivers.
Although it is the least flawed of the intermediate approaches, the
McGowan rule, applying the federal common law rule for welfare plans
and the minority rule for pension plans, is also unsound. First, it does
not appear that any other court or any commentator has explicitly
149
supported this interpretation as a solution.
Second, although there
are reasons why Congress chose not to apply ERISA’s anti-alienation
provision to welfare plans (there are sufficient differences between
the two types of ERISA plans), this solution remains unnecessarily
complex. It would require participants, beneficiaries, plan administrators, and the courts to distinguish between the two plan types and
learn how to function properly under two sets of rules. Having two
sets of rules not only directly contradicts ERISA’s goal of uniform and
simple administration, but it is also a suboptimal solution, in light of
the uniformity of the federal common law approach.
The same arguments that are marshalled against the McGowan
rule can be applied to the third intermediate option: the federal
common law approach without allowing renomination after a waiver.
Additional complexity would result from plan administrators having
to track which plan participants have been the recipients of waivers,
and then having to disallow those participants from electing new
146

See supra Part II (showing why this is the case under either the plan documents
argument or the anti-alienation argument).
147
See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text (explaining ERISA’s preemption
of relevant state law).
148
Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 854 (1997); see also Dotson, supra note 64, at 534
(quoting the same statement in Boggs as a bar on the use of constructive trusts in this
context).
149
This rule is an interpretation of the divided opinion in McGowan v. NJR Service
Corp., 423 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 05-853, 2007 WL 91575 (U.S. Jan.
16, 2007). See supra note 75 and accompanying text (synthesizing McGowan’s holding).
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beneficiaries. Moreover, not allowing plan participants to elect new
beneficiaries is an unsustainable outcome. A plan participant, when
alive, can achieve the same result as the prohibited “indirect assignment” by transferring the plan benefits to the intended recipient after
receiving the benefits and, when deceased, can achieve this result by
executing a testamentary instrument that passes the benefits to the intended recipient. In summary, the intermediate approaches do not
provide an adequate solution to the problem of beneficiary waivers.
D. The Federal Common Law Approach Avoids Absurd Results
The federal common law approach avoids the absurd results generated by the minority rule. Applying the minority rule and its underlying rationale creates numerous potential perversities, including being prevented from finding a beneficiary willing to accept the plan
benefits or having to give the plan benefits to a named beneficiary
who has murdered the plan participant. To illustrate the first potential problem, assume that the beneficiary who waives her right to the
150
plan benefits absolutely refuses to accept the benefits.
Under the
minority rule, the plan administrator could not recognize the waiver
and would have to give the unwanted benefits to the disclaiming
beneficiary. As one commentator noted: “What is a plan to do:
sneak by the beneficiary’s house at night, jimmy open a window, and
151
pour the cash into the bedroom?”
The absurdity of the rationale behind the minority rule is elucidated when one considers the situation where a named beneficiary
murders a participant. Nearly every state has a “slayer statute” that
prevents a murdering heir from receiving property as a result of the
152
murder.
However, using the interpretation of either the plan documents provision or the anti-alienation provision necessary to support
the minority rule would ultimately lead to the murderer receiving the
participant’s ERISA benefits. The minority rule interpretation of the
plan documents provision is that a plan administrator must pay the
beneficiary named on the beneficiary form. Thus, there would be a
150

While at first glance one might question the likelihood of a scenario where a
beneficiary would refuse benefits, it is not an uncommon situation. A beneficiary
might choose to disclaim benefits because of tax consequences, possible disqualification from public assistance for a disabled beneficiary, or purely emotional reasons.
151
Who Is the Payee, supra note 107, at 16.
152
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152 (2001); see also Jeffrey G. Sherman, Mercy
Killing and the Right To Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 803, 844-56 (1993) (providing an overview of slayer statutes).
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direct conflict between the beneficiary under ERISA and the slayer
statute. ERISA’s preemption provision would preempt the slayer stat153
ute, and the murderer would receive the benefits.
The minority rule’s interpretation of the anti-alienation provision
would lead to the same result. Under a slayer statute, the murderer
relinquishes his rights to the participant’s benefits. Applying the same
analysis that the proponents of the minority rule apply to beneficiary
waivers, the slayer statute would qualify as an “indirect arrangement . . . whereby a party acquires from a participant or beneficiary a
154
right or interest enforceable against the plan.”
Again, the slayer
statute would be in direct conflict with ERISA and would be preempted.
The federal common law approach avoids the absurdity of the
murderer receiving the participant’s ERISA benefits by interpreting
the plan documents and anti-alienation provisions in a less strained
and stringent manner. It might, for example, allow one to conclude
that there is no direct conflict between those provisions and state
155
slayer statutes.
Alternatively, even if one were to take a broad view
of ERISA preemption and conclude that the slayer statutes were preempted by ERISA, the federal common law approach would allow for
the judiciary to create federal common law replicating the slayer stat156
utes.
CONCLUSION
The federal common law approach to waivers of ERISA plan benefits by beneficiaries provides the best balance of ensuring an equitable
outcome for participants and beneficiaries while allowing for uniform
and simple plan administration. The federal common law looks to
the parties’ intentions to ensure that the individual counting on receiving ERISA plan benefits to provide for her retirement actually receives those benefits. It is able to do this without jeopardizing uniformity because the federal common law for deciding whether to give
effect to beneficiary waivers is well settled and consistent across the

153

This issue was noted in Egelhoff, but the Court explained: “Those statutes are
not before us, so we do not decide the issue.” 532 U.S. at 152.
154
26 C.F.R. § 1.401(a)-13(c)(1)(ii) (1997).
155
Cf. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 152 (leaving open this possibility).
156
See Gallanis, supra note 145, at 189-98 (discussing the problem of increasing
conflicts between ERISA and state succession law, and finding the development of federal common law to be the most plausible solution).
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circuits. The uniformity of this theory allows for simplicity in application and, therefore, ensures that plan administrators are not overburdened by interpreting possible waivers. In light of these advantages,
the federal common law approach should be universally adopted for
assessing the validity of ERISA benefit waivers.

